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Abstract
In this tutorial we review the essential arguments behing entropic in-
ference. We focus on the epistemological notion of information and its
relation to the Bayesian beliefs of rational agents. The problem of updat-
ing from a prior to a posterior probability distribution is tackled through
an eliminative induction process that singles out the logarithmic relative
entropy as the unique tool for inference. The resulting method of Maxi-
mum relative Entropy (ME), includes as special cases both MaxEnt and
Bayes’ rule, and therefore unifies the two themes of these workshops –
the Maximum Entropy and the Bayesian methods – into a single general
inference scheme.
1 Introduction
Our subject is inductive inference. Our goal in this tutorial paper is to review
the problem of updating from a prior probability distribution to a posterior
distribution when new information becomes available.
First we tackle the question of the nature of information itself: What is
information? It is clear that data “contains” or “conveys” information, but
what does this precisely mean? Is information physical? We discuss how in a
properly Bayesian framework one can usefully adopt a concept of information
that is more directly related to the epistemological concerns of rational agents.
Then we turn to the actual methods to process information. We argue for
the uniqueness and universality of the Method of Maximum relative Entropy
(ME) and then we discuss its relation to Bayesian methods. At first sight
Bayesian and Maximum Entropy methods appear unrelated. Bayes’ rule is the
natural way to update probabilities when the new information is in the form
of data. On the other hand, Jaynes’ method of maximum entropy, MaxEnt,
is designed to handle information in the form of constraints [1]. An important
question is whether they are compatible with each other. We show that the
ME method includes both MaxEnt and Bayesian methods as special cases and
∗Presented at MaxEnt 2010, the 30th International Workshop on Bayesian Inference and
Maximum Entropy Methods in Science and Engineering (July 4-9, 2010, Chamonix, France).
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allows us to extend them to situations that lie beyond the reach of either of
them individually.
Finally we explore an important extension of the ME method. The distri-
bution of maximum entropy has the highest probability of being the correct
choice of posterior, but how justified are we in ruling out those distributions
that do not maximize the entropy? The extended ME assigns a probability to
those other distributions and this has a wide variety of applications: it provides
a connection to the theory of large deviations, to fluctuation theory, to entropic
priors, and most recently to quantum mechanics. The possibilities are endless.
We make no attempt to provide a review of the literature on entropic infer-
ence. The following list, which reflects only some contributions that are directly
related to the particular approach described in this tutorial, is incomplete but
might nevertheless be useful: Jaynes [1], Shore and Johnson [2], Williams [3],
Skilling [4], Rodr´ıguez [5][6], Giffin and Caticha [7]-[12].
2 What is information?
The expression that systems “carry” or “contain” information can perhaps be
traced to Shannon’s theory of communication: a system is analogous to a mes-
sage. The system “carries” information about its own state and, in this sense,
one can say that information is physical. Such physical information is directly
associated to the system. Our interest here is in an altogether different notion
of information which we might call epistemological and which is directly as-
sociated to the beliefs of rational agents. Indeed, any fully Bayesian theory of
information requires an explicit account of how such epistemological information
is related to rational beliefs.
The need to update from one state of belief to another is driven by the
conviction that not all probability assignments are equally good; some beliefs
are preferable to others in the very pragmatic sense that they enhance our
chances to successfully navigate this world. The idea is that, to the extent
that we wish to be called rational, we will improve our beliefs by revising them
when new information becomes available: Information is what forces a change
of rational beliefs. Or, to put it more explicitly: Information is a constraint on
rational beliefs.
This definition – information is a constraint – is sufficient for our present
purposes but would benefit from further elaboration. The definition captures a
notion of information that is directly related to changing our minds: information
is the driving force behind the process of learning. It incorporates an important
feature of rationality: being rational means accepting that our beliefs must
be constrained in very specific ways – not everything goes. But surely this
is not enough: the indiscriminate acceptance of any arbitrary constraint does
not qualify as rational behavior. To be rational an agent must exercise some
judgement before accepting a particular piece of information as a reliable basis
for the revision of its beliefs and this raises questions about what judgements
might be considered sound. Indeed, there is no implication that the information
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must be true; only that we accept it as true. False information is information
too, at least as long as we are prepared to accept it and allow it to affect our
beliefs.
The paramount virtue of our definition is that it is useful. It allows precise
quantitative calculations even though the notion of an amount of information,
whether measured in bits or otherwise, is not introduced. By information in
its most general form, we just mean the set of constraints on the family of
acceptable posterior distributions and this is precisely the kind of information
the method of maximum entropy is designed to handle.
3 Updating probabilities: the ME method
The uncertainty about a variable x ∈ X (whether discrete or continuous, in one
or several dimensions) is described by a probability distribution q(x). Our goal
is to design a method to update from a prior distribution q(x) to a posterior
distribution P (x) when new information in the form of constraints becomes
available. (The constraints can be given in terms of expected values but this is
not necessary. Other types of constraints are allowed too; an example is appears
in section 5.)
The problem is to select a distribution from among all those that satisfy
the constraints. The procedure is to rank the candidate distributions in order
of increasing preference [4]. It is clear that to accomplish our goal the ranking
must be transitive: if distribution p1 is preferred over p2, and p2 is preferred
over p3, then p1 is preferred over p3. Such transitive rankings are implemented
by assigning to each p(x) a real number S[p] in such a way that if p1 is preferred
over p2, then S[p1] > S[p2]. The selected distribution P (one or possibly many,
for on the basis of the available information we might have several equally
preferred distributions) will be that which maximizes the quantity S[p], which
we will henceforth call entropy. We are thus led to a method of Maximum
Entropy (ME) that involves entropies that are real numbers and that are meant
to be maximized. These features are imposed by design; they are dictated by
the function that the ME method is being designed to perform and not by any
objective properties of the external world.
Next we must make a definite choice for the functional S[p]. Since the
purpose of the method is to update from priors to posteriors the ranking scheme
must depend on the particular prior q and therefore the entropy S must be a
functional of both p and q. Thus the entropy S[p, q] produces a ranking of the
distributions p relative to the given prior q: S[p, q] is the entropy of p relative to
q. Accordingly S[p, q] is commonly called relative entropy, but since all entropies
are relative, even when relative to a uniform distribution, the modifier ‘relative’
is redundant and can be dropped.
The functional S[p, q] is selected by a process of eliminative induction. The
idea is simple: we start with a sufficiently broad family of candidates and identify
a number of special cases for which we know what the preferred distribution
ought to be. Then we just eliminate all those candidates that fail to provide the
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right update. As we shall see the selection criteria adopted below are sufficiently
constraining that there is a single entropy functional S[p, q] that survives the
process of elimination.
This approach has a number of virtues. First, to the extent that the selection
criteria are universally desirable, then the single surviving entropy functional
will be of universal applicability too. Second, the reason why any entropy
candidate is eliminated is quite explicit – at least one of the selection criteria is
violated. Thus, the justification behind the single surviving entropy is not that
it leads to demonstrably correct inferences, but rather, that other entropies are
demonstrably wrong.
The selection criteria are chosen to reflect the conviction that information
collected in the past and codified into the prior distribution is valuable and
should not be ignored. This attitude is very conservative: the only aspects of
one’s beliefs that should be updated are those for which new evidence has been
supplied. Moreover, as we shall see below, the selection criteria merely tell us
what not to update, which has the virtue of maximizing objectivity – there are
many ways to change something but only one way to keep it the same. These
ideas are summarized in the following
Principle of Minimal Updating (PMU): Beliefs must be revised only to
the extent required by the new information.
Three selection criteria, a brief motivation for them, and their consequences
for the functional form of the entropy are listed below (proofs and more details
are given in [12]). The reason these criteria are so constraining is that they
refer to three infinitely large classes of special cases where the desired update is
known.
Criterion 1: Locality. Local information has local effects.
If the information to be processed does not refer to an x in a particular subdo-
main D ⊂ X then the PMU requires that we do not change our minds about
x ∈ D. More precisely, we require that the prior conditioned on D is not up-
dated. The selected posterior is such that P (x|D) = q(x|D). Dropping additive
terms and multiplicative factors that do not affect the overall ranking, the sur-
viving entropy functionals are of the form
S[p, q] =
∫
dxF (p(x), q(x), x) , (1)
where F is some unknown function and by
∫
dx we mean a discrete sum or
continuous integral (possibly over several dimensions) as the case might require.
Criterion 2: Coordinate invariance. The system of coordinates carries
no information.
The points x can be labeled in different ways using different coordinate systems
but this should not affect the ranking of the distributions. The consequence of
criterion 2 is that the surviving entropies can be written as
S[p, q] =
∫
dxm(x)Φ
(
p(x)
m(x)
,
q(x)
m(x)
)
, (2)
4
wherem(x) is a probability density, which implies that dxm(x), p(x)/m(x), and
q(x)/m(x) are coordinate invariants. (Again, additive terms and multiplicative
factors that do not affect the overall ranking have been dropped.) We see that
the single unknown function F in (1) with three arguments has been replaced
by two unknown functions. One is the density m(x), and the other is a function
Φ with two arguments. The density m(x) is determined by invoking the locality
criterion once again.
Criterion 1 (a special case): When there is no new information there is
no reason to change one’s mind.
When no new information is available the domain D in criterion 1 coincides with
the whole spaceX . The conditional probabilities q(x|D) = q(x|X ) = q(x) should
not be updated and the selected posterior coincides with the prior, P (x) = q(x).
The consequence is that up to normalization the unknown m(x) must be the
prior distribution q(x). The entropy is now restricted to functionals of the form
S[p, q] =
∫
dx q(x)Φ
(
p(x)
q(x)
)
. (3)
Criterion 3: Independence. When systems are known to be independent
it should not matter whether they are treated separately or jointly.
The preservation of independence is a particularly important concern for science
because without it science is not possible. The reason is that in any inference it
is assumed that the universe is partitioned into the system of interest and other
systems that constitute the rest of the universe. What is important about those
other systems is precisely that they can be ignored – whether they are included
in the analysis or not should make no difference. If they did matter they should
have been incorporated as part of the system of interest in the first place.
It is crucial that Criterion 3 be applied to all independent systems whether
they are identical or not, whether just two or many, or even infinitely many. This
criterion is sufficiently constraining that (up to additive terms and multiplicative
factors that do not affect the overall ranking scheme) there is a single surviving
entropy functional given by the usual logarithmic relative entropy [12],
S[p, q] = −
∫
dx p(x) log
p(x)
q(x)
(4)
These results are summarized as follows:
The ME method: The objective is to update from a prior distribution
q to a posterior distribution P given the information that the posterior lies
within a certain family of distributions p. The selected posterior P is that which
maximizes the entropy S[p, q]. Since prior information is valuable the functional
S[p, q] is chosen so that beliefs are updated only to the minimal extent required by
the new information. No interpretation for S[p, q] is given and none is needed.
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4 Bayes’ rule and its generalizations
Bayes’ rule is used to make inferences about one or several quantities θ ∈ Θ
on the basis of information in the form of data x ∈ X . More specifically, the
problem is to update our beliefs about θ on the basis of three pieces of infor-
mation: (1) the prior information codified into a prior distribution q(θ); (2) the
data x ∈ X (obtained in one or many experiments); and (3) the known relation
between θ and x given by the model as defined by the sampling distribution or
likelihood function, q(x|θ). The updating consists of replacing the prior prob-
ability distribution q(θ) by a posterior distribution P (θ) that applies after the
data has been processed.
Remark: We emphasize that the information about how x is related to θ is
contained in the functional form of the distribution q(·|θ) which is completely
unrelated to the actual values of the observed data.
The insight that will allow Bayes’ rule to be smoothly incorporated into the
entropic inference framework [3][9] is that the relevant universe of discourse is
not Θ but the product space Θ×X [5][6]. We deal with joint distributions and
the relevant joint prior is q(x, θ) = q(θ)q(x|θ).
Remark: Bayes’ rule is usually written in the form
q(θ|x) = q(θ)
q(x|θ)
q(x)
, (5)
and called Bayes’ theorem. This formula is a restatement of the product rule.
It is valid for any value of x whether it coincides with the observed data or
not and therefore it is a simple consequence of the internal consistency of the
prior beliefs. Within the framework of entropic inference the left hand side is
not a posterior but rather a prior probability – it is the prior probability of θ
conditional on x.
Next we collect data and the observed values turn out to be x′. This con-
strains the posterior to the family of distributions p(x, θ) defined by
p(x) =
∫
dθ p(θ, x) = δ(x− x′) . (6)
This data information is not, however, sufficient to determine the joint distri-
bution
p(x, θ) = p(x)p(θ|x) = δ(x − x′)p(θ|x′) . (7)
Any choice of p(θ|x′) is in principle possible. Within the framework of entropic
inference (see [9]) the joint posterior P (x, θ) is the minimal update from the
prior q(x, θ) that agrees with the data constraint. To find it maximize the
entropy,
S[p, q] = −
∫
dxdθ p(x, θ) log
p(x, θ)
q(x, θ)
, (8)
subject to the infinite number of constraints given by eq. (6). Note that there
is one constraint for each value of x. The corresponding Lagrange multipliers
are denoted λ(x). Maximizing (8) subject to (6) and normalization,
δ
{
S + α
[∫
dxdθ p(x, θ)− 1
]
+
∫
dxλ(x)
[∫
dθ p(x, θ)− δ(x− x′)
]}
= 0 , (9)
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yields
P (x, θ) = q(x, θ)
eλ(x)
Z
, (10)
where Z is a normalization constant, and λ(x) is determined from (6),
∫
dθ q(x, θ)
eλ(x)
Z
= q(x)
eλ(x)
Z
= δ(x − x′) , (11)
so that the joint posterior is
P (x, θ) = q(x, θ)
δ(x− x′)
q(x)
= δ(x− x′)q(θ|x) . (12)
The corresponding marginal posterior probability P (θ) is
P (θ) =
∫
dxP (θ, x) = q(θ|x′) = q(θ)
q(x′|θ)
q(x′)
, (13)
which coincides with Bayes’ rule. This is intuitively reasonable: we maintain
those beliefs about θ that are consistent with the data values x′ that turned out
to be true. Data values that were not observed are discarded because they are
now known to be false. The extension to repeatable independent experiments
is straightforward [12].
Next I give a couple of very simple examples that show how entropic methods
allow generalizations of Bayes’ rule.
Example 1.– Jeffrey’s rule. As before, the prior information consists of our
prior knowledge about θ given by the distribution q(θ) and the relation between
x and θ is given by the likelihood q(x|θ). But now the information about x is
limited because the data is uncertain. The marginal posterior p(x) is no longer
a sharp delta function but some other known distribution, p(x) = PD(x). This
is still an infinite number of constraints
p(x) =
∫
dθ p(θ, x) = PD(x) . (14)
Maximizing (8) subject to (14) and normalization, leads to
P (x, θ) = PD(x)q(θ|x) . (15)
The corresponding marginal posterior,
P (θ) =
∫
dxPD(x)q(θ|x) = q(θ)
∫
dxPD(x)
q(x|θ)
q(x)
, (16)
is known as Jeffrey’s rule. In the limit when the data are sharply determined
PD(x) = δ(x− x
′) the posterior reproduces Bayes’ rule (13).
Example 2.– Unknown likelihood. The following example derives and gen-
eralizes Zellner’s Bayesian Method of Moments [13]. Usually the relation be-
tween x and θ is given by a known likelihood function q(x|θ) but suppose this
relation is not known. This is the case when the joint prior is so ignorant that
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information about x tells us nothing about θ and vise versa; such a prior treats
x and θ as statistically independent, q(x, θ) = q(x)q(θ). Since we have no like-
lihood function the information about the relation between θ and the data x
must be supplied elsewhere. One possibility is through a constraint. Suppose
that in addition to normalization and the uncertain data constraint, eq.(14), we
also know that the expected value over θ of a function f(x, θ) is
〈f〉x =
∫
dθ p(θ|x)f(x, θ) = F (x) . (17)
We seek a posterior P (x, θ) that maximizes (8). Introducing Lagrange multipli-
ers α, λ(x), and γ(x),
0 = δ
{
S + α
[∫
dxdθ p(x, θ)− 1
]
+
∫
dxλ(x)
[∫
dθ p(x, θ)− PD(x)
]
(18)
+
∫
dx γ(x)
[∫
dθ p(x, θ)f(x, θ)− PD(x)F (x)
]}
, (19)
the variation over p(x, θ) yields
P (x, θ) =
1
ζ
q(x)q(θ) eλ(x)+γ(x)f(x,θ) , (20)
where ζ is a normalization constant. The multiplier λ(x) is determined from
(6),
P (x) =
∫
dθ P (θ, x) =
1
ζ
q(x)eλ(x)
∫
dθ q(θ) eγ(x)f(x,θ) = PD(x) (21)
then,
P (x, θ) = PD(x)
q(θ) eγ(x)f(x,θ)∫
dθ′ q(θ′) eγ(x)f(x,θ
′)
(22)
so that
P (θ|x) =
P (x, θ)
P (x)
=
q(θ) eγ(x)f(x,θ)
Z(x)
with Z(x) =
∫
dθ′ q(θ′) eγ(x)f(x,θ
′) (23)
The multiplier γ(x) is determined from (17)
1
Z(x)
∂Z(x)
∂γ(x)
= F (x) . (24)
The corresponding marginal posterior is
P (θ) =
∫
dxPD(x)P (θ|x) = q(θ)
∫
dxPD(x)
eγ(x)f(x,θ)
Z(x)
. (25)
In the limit when the data are sharply determined PD(x) = δ(x − x
′) the
posterior takes the form of Bayes theorem,
P (θ) = q(θ)
eγ(x
′)f(x′,θ)
Z(x′)
, (26)
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where up to a normalization factor eγ(x
′)f(x′,θ) plays the role of the likelihood
and the normalization constant Z plays the role of the evidence.
In conclusion, these examples demonstrate that the method of maximum en-
tropy can fully reproduce the results obtained by the standard Bayesian methods
and allows us to extend them to situations that lie beyond their reach such as
when the likelihood function is not known. Other such examples are given in
[11] and [12].
5 Deviations from maximum entropy
To complete the design of the ME method we must address one last issue. Once
we have decided that the distribution that maximizes entropy is to be preferred
over all others we ask: to what extent are the other distributions ruled out?
The discussion below follows [8][12].
The original problem was to update from a prior q(x) given constraints
that define the space Θ of acceptable distributions. We assume that these
distributions, that is, the “points” in the space Θ, can be labelled by coordinates
θ. Thus, Θ is a statistical manifold and its points can be written as p(x|θ).
Maximizing S[p, q] over all the p(x|θ) in Θ leads to the preferred distribution,
say p(x|θ0).
The question about the extent that distributions with θ 6= θ0 are ruled out
is a question about the probability of various values of θ: to what extent do
we believe that the selected value should lie within any particular range dθ?
Thus we are not just concerned with the probability of x, but with the joint
distribution p(x, θ). To assign p(x, θ) we apply the same ME method but in the
larger joint space: maximize the joint entropy
S[p, q] = −
∫
dx dθ p(x, θ) log
p(x, θ)
q(x, θ)
, (27)
for a suitable prior q(x, θ) and under the appropriate constraints.
Choosing a prior is always tricky because it represents what we knew before
the relevant new information became available. We want to represent a state of
extreme ignorance: the precise relation between θs and xs is not (yet) known
and therefore q(x, θ) is a product, q(x, θ) = q(x)q(θ), so that knowing x tells us
nothing about θ and vice versa. For q(x) we retain the prior used in the original
problem where we updated from q(x) to p(x|θ0).
For q(θ) we plead ignorance once again and choose a uniform distribution.
This is somewhat trickier than may seem at first sight because uniform does
not mean constant. The uniform distribution assigns equal probabilities to equal
volumes in Θ and does not depend on the particular choice of coordinates. (A
constant distribution, on the other hand, depends on the choice of coordinates:
a distribution that is constant in one frame coordinate will not be constant
in another.) This requires a well-defined notion of volume. Fortunately, the
statistical manifold Θ is a metric space: there is a single unique geometry that
properly takes into account the fact that the points in Θ are not structureless
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points but are actual probability distributions. This is given by the Fisher-
Rao information metric, gij(θ) [14][12]. The corresponding volume elements are
given by g1/2(θ)dnθ, where g = det gij . Therefore the uniform (unnormalized)
prior is q(θ) = g1/2(θ) and the joint prior is q(x, θ) = g1/2(θ)q(x).
The crucial constraint on the joint distributions p(x, θ) = p(θ)p(x|θ) specifies
the conditional distributions p(x|θ). This amounts to selecting the particular
space Θ under consideration.
The preferred joint distribution P (x, θ) is that which maximizes the joint
entropy S[p, q] over all normalized distributions of the form p(x, θ) = p(θ)p(x|θ)
where we vary with respect to p(θ) and restrict to p(x|θ) ∈ Θ. It is convenient
to rewrite (27) as
S[p, q] = −
∫
dθ p(θ) log
p(θ)
g1/2(θ)
+
∫
dθ p(θ)S(θ), (28)
where
S(θ) = −
∫
dx p(x|θ) log
p(x|θ)
q(x)
. (29)
The result is the probability that θ lies within a small volume g1/2(θ)dnθ,
P (θ)dnθ =
1
ζ
eS(θ)g1/2(θ)dnθ with ζ =
∫
dnθ g1/2(θ) eS(θ) . (30)
The preferred value of θ is that θ0 which maximizes the entropy S(θ), eq.(29),
because this maximizes the scalar probability density expS(θ). But it also tells
us the degree to which values of θ away from the maximum are ruled out.
One of the limitations of the standard MaxEnt method is that it selects a
single “posterior” p(x|θ0) and all other distributions are strictly ruled out. The
result (30) overcomes this limitation and finds many applications. For example,
it extends the Einstein theory of thermodynamic fluctuations beyond the regime
of small fluctuations; it provides a bridge to the theory of large deviations; and,
suitably adapted for Bayesian data analysis, it leads to the notion of entropic
priors.
6 Conclusions
Any Bayesian account of the notion of information cannot ignore the fact that
Bayesians are concerned with the beliefs of rational agents. The relation be-
tween information and beliefs must be clearly spelled out. The definition we
have proposed – that information is that which constrains rational beliefs and
therefore forces the agent to change its mind – is convenient for two reasons.
First, the information/belief relation is explicit, and second, the definition is
ideally suited for quantitative manipulation using the ME method.
The main conclusion is that the logarithmic relative entropy is the only
candidate for a general method for updating probabilities – the ME method
– and this includes both MaxEnt and Bayes’ rule as special cases; it unifies
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them into a single theory of inductive inference and allows new applications.
Indeed, much as the old MaxEnt method provided the foundation for statistical
mechanics, recent work suggests that the extended ME method provides an
entropic foundation for quantum mechanics.
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